Toward Single Pilot Operations: The Impact of the Loss of Non-Verbal Communication on the Flight Deck by Koteskey, Robert et al.
Toward Single Pilot Operations: The Impact of the Loss of 
Non-verbal Communication on the Flight Deck
Joel Lachter1,2  Vernol Battiste1,2 Michael Matessa3
+1 650 604 0796 +1 650 604 3666 +1 650 604 5975
Joel.Lachter@nasa.gov Vernol.Battiste@nasa.gov mpmatess@rockwellcollins.com
Quang V. Dao1,2 Robert Koteskey1,2 Walter W. Johnson2
+1 650 604 6620 +1 650 604 4230 +1 650 604 3667
Quang.V.Dao@nasa.gov Robert.W.Koteskey@nasa.gov Walter.Johnson@nasa.gov
1San Jose State University     2NASA      3Rockwell Collins
Mail to: {Author Name}, NASA Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA 94035
ABSTRACT
Since the 1950s, the crew required to fly transport category 
aircraft has been reduced from five to two. NASA is 
currently exploring the feasibility of a further reduction to 
one pilot. In this study we examine the effects of separating 
the pilots on crew interaction. The results are consistent 
with earlier research on decision-making between remote 
groups. Pilots strongly prefer face-to-face interactions; 
however, we could find no impact of separation on their 
ultimate decisions. There were a number of areas in which 
separation negatively affected communications. We discuss 
possible mitigations for these areas.
Keywords
Single pilot operations (SPO), reduced-crew operations, 
teleconferencing.
INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing aviation community interest in potential 
future operations of transport category aircraft (those flown 
under Part 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, FARs) 
with a single pilot rather than a two-person flight crew [1]. 
There are historical precedents for crew reduction. In the 
1950s, the flight crew was quite large, consisting of a 
Captain, First Officer, Flight Engineer, Navigator, and 
Radio Operator. By the 1980s, technological advances had 
allowed the crew to be reduced to two. Under current 
operations, workload is very low on the flight-deck for 
much of the en route portion of nominal flights. If an 
alternative method could be found for handling high 
workload portions airlines could save substantial money by 
moving to single pilot operations (SPO); in 2010 US air 
carriers spent over nine billion dollars on pilots [2]. Further, 
a move to SPO could also help carriers reduce the 
complexity of scheduling and positioning crews, and allow 
smaller cockpits resulting in lighter aircraft and 
consequently reduced fuel usage. 
A move to SPO might be facilitated by work currently 
being done on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAVs are 
typically flown by a ground-based pilot who performs his 
duties using radio telemetry to and from the aircraft. Given 
this, what are the obstacles to placing the first officer on the 
ground?
This paper discusses an initial exploratory study conducted 
to look for issues with this approach, that is, having ground 
personnel take up some or all of the workload currently 
done by the first officer. Specifically, the current simulation 
was designed to look for effects of pilots separating pilots 
on their ability to work together. The results from this 
initial study will inform design decisions for development 
of a ground station that supports collaborative piloting.
A HUMAN IN THE LOOP SIMULATION
Previous Research
There is a large literature on various forms of remote 
collaboration dating back to the early days of computer 
messaging. A review article by Williams [3] discusses the 
major findings. For cooperative tasks with a common goal 
and objective outcomes, there is little difference in the 
actual results using different communication methods (e.g, 
type written messages, verbal “telephone” communications, 
and face-to-face). There were, however, differences in the 
style of communication; typing resulted in a slower process 
and fewer overall words exchanged than varieties of verbal 
communication (e.g., telephone or face-to-face). In 
contrast, for “conflictful” tasks such as negotiations where 
goals are not always aligned, there were more differences 
between the different forms of communication and more 
dependence on the particulars of the task. Negotiations 
conducted in less personal manner tended to be decided on 
their merits while those conducted in a more personal 
manner (such as face-to-face) appeared to be settled more 
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Figure 2: First officer’s desktop simulator in the separate 
configuration.
Figure 1: Two person desktop simulator.
on interpersonal dynamics [3]. Similarly, in a study in 
which participants were to discuss issues on which their 
opinions differed, they were more likely to change their 
views when the discussion was audio-only than when it 
was face to face [3,4]. On the other hand, in a prisoner’s 
dilemma type game which pits group against individual 
interests, group interests were more highly favored in a 
richer media environment (e.g., audio and visual) than a 
less rich one (e.g., audio only [5]). There are also 
interesting effects of communication type on interpersonal 
relationships. People prefer to converse in the richer 
communication channels (i.e., face-to-face is preferred to 
audio-visual which is preferred to audio-only) and they rate 
people with whom they have face-to-face contact more 
highly than those with which conversations are mediated. 
Also, in studies of group dynamics, richer communications 
tend to result in clearer leaders while more impoverished 
communications lead to egalitarian relationships.
Here we extend this research to an aviation environment. 
This environment differs from those previously studied in 
several important respects. First, pilots are given extensive 
training on procedures that assume they are collocated. 
Second, pilots have particular roles. The captain is 
ultimately responsible for the flight; however either he or 
the first officer can take on the role of pilot flying or pilot 
monitoring. Finally, flying an aircraft is more complicated 
than those tasks for which face-to-face and mediated 
interactions have previously been studied. One 
consequence of this complexity is that flying is not easily 
categorized as cooperative or conflictful. For example, 
while pilots share basic goals of safety and efficiency, they 
may disagree about priorization when abnormal conditions 
occur such as poor weather conditions or passenger illness.
Method 
To examine the ability of non-collocated pilots to 
collaborate, we created a desktop simulation environment 
that allowed us to run pilots in two conditions, seated side-
by-side as they are today, or seated in separate rooms with 
similar displays and controls but only an open microphone 
for communication. We felt “building a wall” between the 
pilots while maintaining current day operating procedures 
would expose aspects of current procedures and 
coordination that would have to be addressed in the 
development of equipment and procedures for coordinating 
a single pilot with a ground operator. It was expected that 
performance on some tasks would be dependent on visual 
cues and thus that performance on those tasks would suffer 
when the pilots were separated. 
Participants
Ten two-pilot crews participated in this experiment; one 
crew per day. Pilots recruited had a minimum of 300 hours 
Boeing commercial glass cockpit experience in the past six 
months (or last six months flying before retiring). All pilots 
were active or had retired within the last six months.
Experimental design
The design of this experiment is extremely simple. There is 
one within subjects fixed factor: Together vs Separate and 
one random factor: Crew.
In the Together condition participant crews sat together at a 
low fidelity, desktop based flight simulator (see Figure 1). 
In the Separate condition, the FO was relocated to a second 
room, where the right hand seat of the dual cockpit 
configuration was reproduced (Figure 2). The captain 
remained at the left seat of the dual pilot flight deck, 
however, the right side monitors with the FO’s PFD, Nav 
Display and a tablet that presented workload probes to the 
FO were turned off. An “open mike” communication 
system (functionally similar to speakerphones) was placed 
between the Captain and FO’s stations so that all verbal 
communications could continue as normal. However, no 
body language or other non-verbal communication (e.g., 
sharing notes taken on ATIS or pointing to approach plates) 
could occur.
Concept of operations
Operations in this study were as close to current day as 
practical. In particular, the separation of the two pilots was 
not meant to introduce a new concept of remote operation. 
Both pilots were assumed to be in the same aircraft. 
However, because, we were testing the effect of non-
physical co-presence on decision-making and 
communication, we chose to make the pilots invisible to 
one another. The primary differences from current day 
operations resulted from the limited fidelity of the simulator 
that, for example, precluded an out-the-window view so 
pilots were always “head down”. 
Scenarios
Each crew participated in six 15-minute scenarios. In each 
scenario pilots were required to divert to an airport other 
than their original destination. Diversions were for weather, 
equipment failures, medical emergencies and/or airport 
closures. Additional events constrained the choice of 
airport. For example, failure of the antiskid system required 
pilots to calculate the stopping distance of the aircraft to 
determine what runways they could land on. In all cases, 
crews had access to a (confederate) air traffic controller.
Experimental aircraft were either arrivals flying into or 
departures flying out of one of six airports in the Rocky 
Mountain region: DEN (Denver), COS (Colorado Springs), 
PUB (Pueblo), CYS (Cheyenne), EGE (Eagle; Vale) and 
GJT (Grand Junction). This airspace was chosen because 
typical weather patterns can shut down many of these 
airports and there are no other major airports for a 
considerable distance surrounding this area. We felt this 
would give us a degree of control in what airports crews 
would (or at least should) ultimately decide to divert to.
Before beginning each scenario, each pilot was given a 
Flight Plan, Weather Briefing, Maintenance Briefing, 
sectionals and approach plates for airports in the region, 
materials similar to what they would be given on a real 
flight. Pilots went through this material, seated together in 
the Together condition and separately (with an open 
microphone) in the Separate condition.
Flight crews in all conditions were expected to safely and 
efficiently manage their flight toward a safe landing. 
Additionally, arriving flights were asked to land with 
approximately 8000 pounds of fuel. 
Schedule
Each day consisted of approximately two hours of training, 
six 15 minute experimental runs, and a one to two hour 
debriefing.
Dependent variables
We collected a variety of objective and subjective 
measures. For subjective measures we collected both real 
time and post-trial workload ratings. Real time workload 
was collected using a probe procedure. Every three minutes 
the pilots heard a tone and a response panel appeared on a 
display to the left (for the captain) or right (for the first 
officer) of the flight displays (see Figures 1 and 2), from 
which the pilot selected one of nine boxes marked 1-Low to 
9-High. The post-trial workload was assessed on a paper 
questionnaire with the same scale. Two workload questions 
were asked on this questionnaire; one asked pilots to rate 
their overall workload for the scenario and the other asked 
them to rate their peak workload. This post-trial 
questionnaire also asked for ratings and comments about 
other aspects of the scenario. There was also a more 
extensive questionnaire given at the end of the 
experimental session on which pilot participants were 
asked to directly compare communication and decision 
processes in the Together condition to those in the Separate 
condition. The questions presented in these questionnaires 
were developed using a “cognitive walkthrough” procedure 
in which crews were run through a subset of the scenarios 
that were presented in the main experiment [6]. 
In addition to these subjective measures we looked at 
objective measures of the quality of the decisions being 
made as well as the process by which they were made. The 
scenarios were designed with the goal of making one 
particular divert decision a clearly better choice. Whether 
the crews ended up at the correct airport provided an 
objective measure of decision quality. Similarly the amount 
of fuel remaining provided a measure of whether their 
decisions were made and executed in a sufficiently timely 
manner.
All interactions were videotaped to allow for analysis of 
particular crew actions. We were particularly interested in 
examining Crew Resource Management (CRM) behaviors. 
CRM is aimed at reducing errors by improving teamwork 
among the crew. It is credited with reducing the accident 
rate over the last 40 years [7]. CRM procedures insure that 
decisions are cross checked and that the reasoning behind 
them is explicit and understood by both crew members.
Results
A simulation such as this generates a large amount of data 
in many categories. To clarify the presentation, we have 
organized the results according to the conclusions we draw 
from them. We will begin by discussing the surprising (at 
least to us) number of measures where separation showed 
no adverse impact. We then turn to the measures where 
separation did show an adverse impact, and attempt to 
characterize how these measures differ from those where 
no differences were seen. Finally we turn to data from the 
post-simulation questionnaire on which pilots were asked 
to directly compare the Together and Separate conditions.
Measures where separation showed no adverse impact
The literature comparing audio-only to face-to-face 
communications suggests that, for objective tasks, 
performance is roughly equivalent [3]. However, given that 
pilots have extensive experience with procedures for when 
they are sitting together (today’s nominal operation), one 
might expect superior performance in the Together 
condition. On many measures this was not the case. In this 
section we will discuss a number of measures on which we 
thought it likely we would find differences but found none.
Workload ratings. Pilots rated their workload in three 
separate assessments: Real Time ratings of workload 
assessed by probes during the trial, Overall ratings of 
average workload for a trial, assessed on a questionnaire 
after the trial, and Peak workload for the trial, assessed on 
the same post-trial questionnaire. Figure 3 shows means for 
all three. No differences between the Separate and Together 
conditions were significant (F1,9 = 1.4 for Real Time; Fs < 
1.0 for Overall and Peak). This does not seem to be due to 
Figure 3. Pilot estimates of their workload. Left panel shows ratings broken down by configuration; right panel 
shows ratings broken down by scenario. 
Figure 4. Differences between Together and Separate in response to post-trial questionnaire. Dark shaded bars indicated 
significant differences.
lack of sensitivity since on all three measures there were 
highly significant differences between the scenarios (see 
Figure 3; F5,45 = 6.0, p < .001 for Real Time; F5,45 = 6.6, p 
< .001 for Overall; F5,45 = 7.2, p < .0001 for Peak).
Other post-trial ratings. In addition to workload, the post-
trial questionnaire asked pilots to rate ten aspects of their 
experience on the scenario. These questions and the pilot 
ratings are summarized in Figure 4. As can be seen, there is 
little effect for six of the ten ratings. We will discuss those 
Table 1: Number of confusions
What is the other pilot doing?
Where is information on the 
approach plates?
















measures with differences under “Measures adversely 
impacted by separation” below. However, we found it 
notable that no difference was found across a variety of 
questions given that pilots are very practiced in procedures 
that assume they are side-by-side. Difficulty of the divert 
decision, crew coordination, awareness of developing 
conditions and ability to discuss the weather were all rated 
very similarly in the Together and Separate conditions.
Objective measures. To test for differences in outcomes 
between the Together and Separate conditions, we 
examined the final destination chosen by the crew and how 
much fuel they landed with. Each scenario was designed so 
that one of the six airports was the “optimal” airport to land 
at, and, in fact, a plurality of crews landed at this airport for 
each of the scenarios, arguing that it was, indeed, the best 
choice. However, on roughly one quarter of the trials, crews 
selected a different airport. There was no significant 
difference between the number of times the crew chose the 
optimal airport in the Together and Separate conditions, 
t(9)=1.62, p = 0.14. In fact, contrary to our expectations, 
the trend was for more flights to land at the “optimal” 
airport in the Separate condition than in the Together 
condition (80% vs. 63%).
In arrival scenarios pilots were asked to land with 8000 
pounds of fuel. Based on pre-study interviews this was seen 
as a common practice for the aircraft simulated in this 
study. Fuel was not an issue in the departure scenarios but 
in the arrival scenarios the majority of aircraft landed with 
less. On average arrival aircraft landed with 7,100 pounds 
of fuel in the Together condition and 6,900 pounds of fuel 
in the Separate condition, a difference that was not 
significant (F < 1). (Note that, in our scenarios aircraft 
never actually landed; landing fuel is estimated by the FMS 
at the end of the scenario.)
Crew resource management. As noted above, CRM is 
considered by many to be a key factor in the increase in 
safety over the last 40 years. To that end, we examined one 
key component of CRM, the degree to which pilots double 
check and acknowledge input by the other crewmember. 
We felt this measure might reflect differences because some 
acknowledgements are non-verbal and these may have been 
disrupted when the pilots could not see each other. To get a 
clear count of the number of acknowledgements we looked 
at every time the execute button on the CDU was pressed 
and determined whether the changes had been 
acknowledged. Acknowledgement rates were about 50% in 
both conditions and did not differ significantly (F < 1).
Measures adversely impacted by separation
While there was surprising similarity in the Together and 
Separate conditions on many measures, there were a 
number of measures on which they were quite different. 
These measures point to specific deficits occurring when 
the pilots are separated. We discuss these here.
Confusions. Analysis of the video was done to find 
instances where the pilots appeared confused (e.g., asked 
what the other pilot was doing or misinterpreting the 
approach plates). There were 70 confusions identified, the 
majority of which occurred when the pilots were separated. 
Fifty-two confusions occurred in the Separate condition 
while only eighteen occurred in the Together condition. 
This is a significant difference (χ2 > 15, p < .001). We 
categorized the confusions according to what the pilots 
were confused about and whether they were in the Separate 
or Together conditions (see Table 1). Most confusions fell 
into three categories: “What is the other pilot doing?”, 
“Where is information in the briefing material?”, and 
“Where is information on the approach plates?”. For each 
of these categories many more confusions occurred in the 
Separate condition than in the Together condition, although 
for other confusions this pattern was less obvious. 
One should be careful in interpreting these observed 
confusions. It is likely that some confusions occurred that 
were not observed and they may have been easier to 
observe in the Together condition. For example, if a pilot 
was not sure what his co-pilot was doing in the Together 
condition he might be able to find out by watching him, 
while in the Separate condition he might have to ask. The 
latter would almost certainly be more easily observed than 
the former. However, these confusion data closely match 
the ratings data reported below where observability is not 
an issue. Thus, we feel it is very likely that the differences 
seen here were differences experienced by the pilots.
Post-trial ratings. As noted above, many questions from the 
post-trial questionnaire were rated almost identically in the 
Together and Separate conditions. However, significant 
differences were found when pilots were asked to rate their 
agreement on several questions (see Figure 4). Specifically, 
“I knew what the other crewmember was doing most of the 
time,” (Together 2.28, Separate 3.63; F1,9 = 18.75, p < .01); 
“It was easy to discuss information on the approach 
plates,” (Together 3.16, Separate 3.92; F1,9 = 10.6, p < .01); 
and “It was easy to communicate with the other 
crewmember,” (Together 2.30, Separate 3.38; F1,9 = 12.2, p 
< .01). Further, a marginally significant difference was 
Figure 5: Differential workload by pilot. A-C) The mean of 
all workload ratings for each pilot in the Together 
condition subtracted from the mean in the Separate 
condition. D) Ratings of whether workload had been 
higher in the Together or Separate condition. 
found when they were asked to rate their agreement with: 
"It was easy to discuss our position relative to external 
objects (weather, airports, etc.)," (Together 2.63, Separate 
3.63; F1,9 = 3.8, p = .08 ). Notice that the first two questions 
correspond to the two most common sources of confusion 
found in the confusion analysis: what the other pilot was 
doing and the approach plates. The third is a generic 
question about communication. These three all appear to 
deal with matters where one might expect a greater reliance 
on non-verbal communications; the actions of the other 
pilot are usually observed and approach plates and briefing 
materials can be passed back and forth and pointed to. 
Similar issues also arise in discussing the positions of 
external objects, especially in this experiment where there 
was no out-the-window view. Location information was 
only found on paper (the approach plates for airport 
locations; ATIS slips for weather) and on the Navigation 
Display. These are information dense displays that pilots 
are probably used to sharing and pointing at and thus it is 
logical that using them should be judged more difficult in 
the Separate condition.
Responding to probes. In analyzing the probe data (see 
Figure 3, above) we came across an interesting 
phenomenon. For two of our 20 crews, the FO largely 
ignored the probes in the Separate condition but answered 
quite regularly in the Together condition. In one crew the 
FO responded to none of the 15 probes in the Separate 
condition, but 12 of the 13 probes in the Together condition 
(χ2 = 20.6, p < .0001). In the other crew, the FO responded 
to 3 of the 14 probes in the Separate condition, but 10 of 
the 14 probes in the Together condition (χ2 = 5.2, p < .05). 
The exact reason for this is unclear. Seeing the other pilot 
react to the probe could serve as an added cue to respond. 
Alternatively, the presence of another pilot might provide 
“social pressure” to respond. Both of these point to 
potential issues for SPO. A second pilot may provide an 
additional cue to perform tasks, and may provide social 
pressure to perform tasks (like checklists) that are not 
productive 99% of the time but are occasionally critical.
Post-simulation questionnaire comparisons
Despite similarities in their overall performance, pilots 
generally disliked the Separate condition. This can be seen 
most clearly in their responses to the post-simulation 
questionnaire and their comments in the debriefing. A 
particularly interesting contrast is between the ratings of 
actual workload during the trial (as seen in the workload 
probes and post-trial questionnaire discussed above) and 
ratings of workload on the post-simulation questionnaire.
Workload comparisons. On each trial we obtained ratings 
of workload during the trial (Real Time) or just after the 
trial (Overall and Peak Workload ratings). Then in a post-
simulation questionnaire we asked pilots to rate whether 
their workload had been higher when they were Together or 
Separate on a nine point scale (with the center marked as 
No Difference). Frequency histograms for pilot ratings on 
all four measures are shown in Figure 5. For the probe and 
post-trial ratings (panels A- C), the mean Together rating 
was subtracted from the mean Separate rating for each 
pilot, while panel D uses the direct comparisons asked for 
the in post simulation questionnaire. 
Panel D shows that fifteen pilots responded that their 
workload was higher when they were Separate and four 
responded that they were equal and only one responded that 
workload was higher when Together. This contrasts with 
the results found for trial specific ratings (panels A-C), 
where no significant differences were found between the 
Separate and Together conditions. Clearly many pilots who 
rated the Together trials and the Separate trials the same 
during or immediately after the trial, later rated workload as 
being higher in the Separate condition. Why?
We thought of several related reasons as to why the data 
might show a different relative workload for the Together 
and Separate conditions as a function of when the ratings 
were taken. The first is the way the questions are worded. 
The probes and post-trial questionnaires ask pilots to rate 
their workload. The post-simulation questionnaire, on the 
other hand, asks for a comparison or choice (“My workload 
was higher when…”). It is possible that such a “two 
alternative forced choice” task was a more sensitive 
measure of differences in workload. An alternative is that 
the post-simulation question asks the pilots to average over 
a variety of situations encountered across the six scenarios. 
Thinking back and comparing their experiences in the 
Together and Separate conditions may induce pilots to 
think more generally about the concept. 
Another alternative explanation of the difference between 
the direct ratings of workload on the probes and post-trial 
questionnaires versus comparison on the post-simulation 
questionnaire is that on the post-simulation questionnaire 
pilots rate something easier to call to mind than workload. 
Kahneman has argued that such substitutions are quite 
common [8]. Evidence for this comes from comments 
made by the pilots in a comment section following the 
workload question. Ten pilots cited increased need to talk 
as a reason for their higher workload ratings, and six cited a 
lack of awareness as to what the other pilot was doing. 
Interestingly, these issues (ease of communication and 
knowing what the other pilot was doing) were the two 
issues where the Separate condition was rated the most 
inferior to the Together condition on the post-trial 
questionnaire where no effect of workload was found.
Comparisons between the Separate and Together 
conditions. The post-simulation questionnaire included ten 
questions where pilots were asked to rate whether the 
Separate or Together condition better exemplified safe and 
efficient flight operations across all flight regimes. These 
included questions on safety, workload (see above), ease of 
communication, coordination, and decision-making. With 
three exceptions, no pilot rated the Separate condition as 
better exemplifying a positive quality or the Together 
condition as better exemplifying a negative one. Thus, the 
overwhelming majority of responses indicated a preference 
for the Together condition.
Opinions on possible mitigations
The goal of this initial study was to surface potential issues 
with pilot coordination and decision making caused by 
separation. Cognitive walkthroughs conducted in the run-
up to the experiment suggested that not knowing what the 
other pilot was doing and a disruption of the standard 
procedures for acknowledgements were two likely issues. 
As a result, we asked the pilots on the post-simulation 
questionnaire to rate two possible mitigations generated in 
the cognitive walkthroughs and asked an open-ended 
question regarding other possible mitigations.
Video. To mitigate the lack of awareness about the other 
pilot’s actions, one suggestion was to install video so that 
the pilots could see each other. Pilots were asked to rate 
their agreement or disagreement (on a nine-point scale, 
with 1- positive and 9 negative) with the statement “I 
would like to have some way to see my crewmember when 
we are separated (e.g., a video link).” The mean rating was 
4.9, (5 was neutral). While some were positive toward the 
idea (one commented “Good idea!” and another “Just to 
have emotional connection w/ co-worker”), many seemed 
to feel that the video “Would be mostly a distraction.”
CRM indicators. Another idea was to give pilots a visual 
signal as a method of acknowledging input (an idea we 
have subsequently referred to as CRM indicators). This 
idea also had many negative responses, but it had many 
positive ones also. Asked to rate their agreement with the 
statement “I would like to have a visual signal that the 
other crewmember concurred with my input rather than 
counting on verbal communication in the Separate 
condition (e.g., the altitude window turning green when the 
other crewmember agreed it was set correctly),” the 
average rating was 3.7 (on a 1 to 9 scale; moderate 
agreement).
Other suggestions. In response to an open-ended question 
(“What other tools or procedures would have helped you in 
the separate condition?”), four pilots suggested more 
explicit SOPs and two commented that they liked the CRM 
indicator idea. More explicit SOPs (like the CRM 
indicators) might serve to help pilots better understand 
what their partner was doing. In addition, one suggested “A 
‘common display’ (i.e. an electronic flight bag, or EFB) that 
would automatically display the same data to both pilots 
such as approach plates, or ATIS”. This idea might help to 
solve issues with the approach plates and briefing materials.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that pilots generally did not like the Separate 
condition. This was expected, given their training and long 
experience flying side-by-side. It is then, perhaps, more 
surprising that greater differences were not found on our 
performance metrics or ratings taken during or immediately 
after each scenario. Our data suggest that the effects of 
separating pilots on their ability to collaborate are primarily 
focused on a relatively narrow range of issues. Primary 
among these is an ability to know what the other pilot is 
doing. This showed up in both ratings data and in the 
observed confusions. There were also issues around certain 
exchanges between the pilots where, when together, they 
could point or exchange paper (e.g., charts). This showed 
up in the number of confusions around the approach plates 
and briefings as well as the superiority of the Together 
condition in ratings of the ease of discussing the approach 
plates, and, to a lesser extent, when discussing external 
objects which were generally represented graphically on 
the Navigation Display and charts. These differences may 
explain the overall lower rating of the Separate condition 
for communication; although this may also be attributed to 
a common preference for face-to-face communication. 
These findings match those found in academic laboratory 
settings. In that literature, the quality of decisions is 
generally found to be as good if not better when 
participants are separated, despite the fact that participants 
generally prefer to communicate face-to-face. In that 
literature there are exceptions; as here, people have more 
difficulty with interpersonal tasks that require knowing the 
state of other participants. This study incorporated a 
number of materials crucial to aviation about which it was 
also easier to communicate face-to-face, in particular the 
approach plates and briefing materials. The most likely 
reason these are easier to discuss face-to-face is that 
communication is simplified by the ability to point and pass 
these objects back and forth. The fact that our findings line 
up with those found in laboratory settings is encouraging 
because it suggests they are robust to incidental changes 
such as scenarios, equipment and, to some degree, the 
concept of operations. 
Two ideas for mitigating the problems observed in this 
study received some support from the post-simulation 
questionnaire. Having some sort of visual indicator to allow 
for non-verbal acknowledgement of crewmember actions 
was generally supported (although a quarter of the pilots 
did not see such a scheme as being useful). Having a video 
feed so that the pilots could see each other got fewer 
positive and more neutral responses than the indicators, but 
was still rated positively by nine of the 20 crew members. 
With a proper implementation it might be useful to a large 
proportion of the pilots. One pilot also suggested a shared 
EFB that would keep pilots “on the same page”. In a 
follow-on study presented in this volume, we implemented 
these suggestions in a prototype ground station. In that 
study pilots rated each of these tools positively; however 
crews still showed a strong preference for flying in the 
traditional side-by-side configuration [9]. Finally, several 
pilots named more explicit SOPs as a possible mitigation to 
the problems of Separation. Improved procedures and 
training may reduce the confusions and ease the pilot 
discomfort found here. This study serves primarily to point 
to areas where training and elaboration of procedures is 
necessary.
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